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The Civilised Self and the Barbaric
Other: imperial delusions of order and
the challenges of human security
IKECHI MGBEOJI
In the aftermath of the military conflicts of 1936 -45, there seemed to
be a global renunciation of war as an instrument of state policy. Shortly
thereafter , however , decades of ideological attrition bet ween the major powers
and the inherent perversion of postcolonial states reduced the solemn
declarations of 1945 to ineffectual rhetoric. Underpinning the decline and
demise of a human-centred approach to global peace and security is the
enduring notion of the civilised self and the barbaric other. The polarisation of
humanity between camps of the savage and the civilised has continued to
animate international policy making despite denials. This paper argues that a
rejection of the polarities is imperative for the success of the emergent concept of
human security.

ABSTRACT

In Collective Insecurity, 1 I examined the changing character of collective
security in post-cold war Africa. I argued that both international institutions
and the hypocrisy of powerful states have combined to encourage and abet
the tyrannical capture of many African states and the reduction of several of
them to pathetic sites for the egregious abuse of millions of people. Further, I
posited that the reduction of several postcolonial states to 'geographies of
injustice', 2 especially in the cold war era, was a consequence of the prevailing
militarised concept of security. In the past decade , however, a careful
observer of contemporary world order would clearly see the re-emergence of
a militarised concept of security .
Events in Afghanistan and Iraq evidence a return of a militarised concept
of state security. A troubling aspect of this phenomenon is the revitalisation

of the omperialistic notion of the barbaric other and the civilised self. By this
logic the former is depicted as anarchic, primitive and in need of 'pacification '
and civilisation. The process of pacification and civilisation often involves
military attacks and vilification of those believed to be uncivilised. Embedded
in this narrative is the belief that the 'savage' peoples of the global South,3 a
diverse bloc of peoples, cultures and societies, are a menace and a threat to
global peace.
From this prism complex and problematic issues such as international
terrorism,

4

Israeli -Palestinian conflict,

5

militant Islam,6 proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction,7 epidemics and pandemics, 8 and state failure
are peculiarly construed as emanating from the 'anarchic', 'theocratic' and
'undeveloped' global South. In this binary conception of global security, the
cause, location and site of resolving growing threats to global security are
fixed in the global South. The metaphor of the global North as the
overworked nanny, constantly at pains to supervise the 'development' of a
delinquent, infantilised group of peoples, 9 is one that has for centuries
underpinned so-called North -South relations. 10
Entwined in the praxis of this metaphor is the brutalisation of the 'savage'
by the 'civilised'. The 'burden of taming the savages' entails a persistent
pattern of brutality and imperialism. This process is historically evidenced in
European colonialism and iterated in contemporary narratives of a 'violent
Islamic world'. It is a process that has mutated over time while retaining its
imperialistic essence. Inspired by certain ideological fundamentalisms and
unyielding certitude, the cycle and pattern of a civilised self and a barbaric

other is repeatedly re-enacted by colonialism, cultural imperialism, military
depredations, and an unrelenting political and economic interference in the
domestic affairs of the global South. 11
In this paper I explore the metaphor of the civilised self and the savage

other in the context of the emerging concept of human security. I interrogate
the notion that the global South is the cause and origin of contemporary
global insecurity. My thesis is that the North and South are mutually
vulnerable, sharing a common destiny, which cannot be realised unless
notions of a civilised self and a barbaric other are abandoned.
My analysis also questions the complicity and abetment of some scholars
devoted to ideological certitudes of free market economies and Western-style
democracy as a universal panacea for political and economic problems in the
South. Of course, there are normative virtues in liberal philosophy which are
indispensable for civilised existence. However, the history of the relations
between the 'civilised self and the 'barbaric other' reveals a common and
persistent pattern of domination of the 'barbaric' by the 'civilised', who
nonetheless profess liberal ideals. The paradox, thus, is that the brutalisation of
the 'savage' by the 'civilised' is a cause and effect of the civilising mission
inherent in the certitudes, assumptions and dogmas of Western-style liberalism,
persuaded by itself of the universality and superiority of its own habits,
convictions and historical experiences.
My analysis is animated by theoretical approaches favoured by the Third
World Approaches to

International law

(TWAIL).
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Structurally and

thematically this paper is divided into three parts. The first introduces the

binary concept of civilisation, its influence on colonialism and state security.
Colonialism and empire are explicated, not as epochs in human history but as
radical and ongoing structural reconfigurations of the globe. The second part
examines the limitations of the classical concept of state security and the
emergence of the concept of human security. Part three scrutinizes the abuse
and misuse of certain basic tenets of neoliberalism, such as democracy, human
rights and free market systems, as apologia for the evisceration of human
dignity in the global South. I argue that the perversion of neoliberal values
of human dignity and freedom constitutes a threat to human security across
the globe.

The civilised self and the barbaric other

Cultural chauvinism is nothing new and notions of the civilised self and the
barbaric other are ancient. But the worrying aspect of this phenomenon is the
brutalisation

that the 'civilised' inflicts on the 'savage' in the name of

enlightening and pacifying the latter. The savagery inherent in the civilisin5
mission stretches from the ridiculous Taliban obsession with lengthy beards 1
as a shibboleth of piety, to the genocide of the American natives by European
imperialists. 14
Indeed, a notion of the civilised self and the barbaric other underpins the
infamous North -South divide. The global North,

15

often described as the

'developed', 'advanced' countries of the world, is often contrasted with the
'developing countries', or Third World' nations of the world. 16 The totalising
impact of a shared history of extreme European colonialism and depredation

in the past half millennium is often used as a touchstone in banding together a
huge array of complexities. 17
Modern history is filled with various forms of colonialism and conquest
inspired by cultural chauvinism and economic exploitation, but none has
been as violent and enduring in its radical transformation of the globe as
European colonialism

18

in the global South. Imperial Europe adopted a

religious and geopolitical campaign that bifurcated the world into a civilised
Europe and a savage 'other'. This oppositional logic was the anchor for the
unprecedented dispossession and

genocide of colonised peoples and

territories. 19
To be regarded as 'civilized', the 'savage' is required to imbibe and
reproduce Eurocentric norms, values and institutions. As Makau Wa Mutua
notes, within this prevailing logic of colonialism, 'history is a linear,
unidirectional progression with the "superior" and "scientific" Western
civilisation leading and paving the way for others to follow' .20 In its totalising
mission colonialism rarely roused itself to acknowledge the multitude of
differences among peoples and cultures of the global South.21
European colonialism

22

did not countenance or acknowledge the

complexity and diversity of the Islamic worlds.23 Imperial Europe
surveyed the complexity and diversity of Islamic peoples and summed them
all into one: a barbarous, stagnant, heathen and vile brood. This process, the
birth of Orientalism in 1095,24 summoned Europe to the first crusade
against the 'enemies of God'. As Richard Falk has presciently observed, in
such dualist conception, Islam was portrayed by scholarly discourse as an

unchanging essence that can only produce uniformly oppressive political
arrangements. In contrast, the 'Western mind is uniquely positioned as
rational and coherent'.25
Orientalism seems to endure forever. Current rhetoric on the so-called
'Islamic mind', or 'Arab mind',26 as captured in the works of people like
Samuel Huntington, reflects an uncritical acceptance of a totalising narrative
of the civilised self and the barbaric other. In the so-called 'clash of
civilisations' the Islamic world was often depicted 'as a monolithic and
unitary structure, opposed to all that was modern and irremediably autocratic
in state/society relations'. In recent times this binary logic has inspired
the narrative that current spasms of violence by some disaffected Islamic
militants is the product of 'Islam's failed encounter with modernity'! Once
the depiction of the 'savage other' as an unruly horde is completed, the
'civilised self justifies its brutalisation of the former as a heaven-ordained
task of pacification and civilisation.27 This mission, often backed with
tremendous violence, is uniquely construed as an unavoidable task of
creating order from the chaotic environment of the savage. To achieve this
objective, international law and institutions were often summoned to the
service of power and empire. International law could not have served
imperialism well if it did not share and reflect the ethos, philosophies,
temperament and delusions of empire.28
Having dispossessed the natives of the so-called 'backward territories' 29 of
their lands, resources and cultures, the colonial powers proceeded to carve up
the colonised territories. The resulting colonial states were brutal in their

exploitation of the colonised. To maintain 'order' in the colonies, the
'civilised self had to rely on a militaristic concept of state security. As long as
there were no direct military conflicts between states, the misery of the
colonised was never considered to be a matter of state security. Thus the
history of state formation in the global South, especially in Africa and in
the Middle East, 30 holds the key to an understanding of the degraded nature
of state security in those territories. 31
Imperialism required the sustenance of non-democratic political entities in
the colonised territories and the economic humiliation of the colonised.32 At
the dawn of political independence many newly decolonised states were
deliberately looted and impoverished. In some cases monarchs were created
overnight. As outposts of empire many colonial states33 were mere conduit
pipes for the transfer of resources to the imperial metropolis. Peace of the
graveyard was mistaken for peace!
Why did such a denuded concept of humanity survive for so long? Three
interrelated factors may be posited. First, colonial states were creatures of a
world order fashioned on the Westphalian paradigm, with its rigid deference
to the canons of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
Second, colonial states lacked local institutions for the humane and
legitimate regulation of power. Third, the prevailing praxis of state security
did not encompass 'the development of human dignity and basic rights'.
At the formal end of colonialism the first generation of rulers in many
postcolonial states tended to perpetuate the militarised concept of state
security to secure their tenuous hold on power. Effective control over the

newly 'decolonised' territories became a licence to pillage the state and
oppress the citizenry. In addition, cold war politics afforded ample shield from
critical external gaze. The rule of 'big men' and thugs converted colonies
into personal fiefdoms.
The brutalisation of the citizenry was often justified on the spurious and
nebulous grounds of 'state security' and the alleged need to maintain 'peace
and stability' in the state. The maxim salus populi suprema lex (the safety of
the people is the supreme law) was widely invoked by dictators and tyrants to
justify the enslavement of people. By an adroit mixture of coercion and
corruption of the domestic order and deft manipulation of the international
security paradigm, tyrants held sway in their respective domestic domains. The
impoverishment of the concept of security through perverted methods could
not have succeeded without the active connivance of powerful states and
institutions.
Special attention must be paid to the self-serving and wicked foreign
policies of imperial powers and the impact of such policies of global
security. The defunct Soviet Union, for example, engaged in systematic
brutality, widespread atrocities and the ruthless suppression of independent
thought in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the USA engaged in what it
characterised as 'low intensity conflict', a euphemism for the gradual,
systematic and sustained destruction of regimes and peoples opposed to its
policies across the world. In Nicaragua, for example, President Reagan
once described the bandit Contras as 'the moral equivalent of our
Founding Fathers'. 34

In the name of spreading democracy and a free market economy the
USA has supported and in many cases installed right-wing military
dictatorships in the global South. French and Belgian troops were
routinely dispatched to prop up tyrants in Africa. Millions of peoples in
the global South have perished as a result of US-supported aggression,
policies and terrorism in postcolonial territories.
The militarised concept of security is also evidenced by the arms race
during the Cold War. With 702 military installations throughout the world in
132 countries, the USA possesses 8000 active and operational nuclear
warheads (2000 of which are on hair trigger alert, ready to be launched
with 15

minutes warning), thousands of chemical and biological

warheads, thousands of military aircraft, and hundreds of battle-ready
warships. With such a deadly arsenal, the question remains whether the
world is necessarily a secure place.

Collective security: the limits of armed force

The concept of collective security is premised on the notion that 'peace
is universal and indivisible'.35 In its classical formulation, collective
security purports that an alliance of states with similar values and
interests is a reliable bulwark against unilateral aggression.36 Collective
insecurity operates on the idea that the presence of an overwhelming
collective military force operating in a multilateral framework is a deterrent
to errant unilateral aggression.

37

The Wilsonian ideal of a 'universal

government of all states' never really saw the light of day.38 Nevertheless,

the carnage39 in the so-called world wars40 persuaded many states that
global security was best secured through a multilateral regime. Inasmuch
as the notion of peace was construed to be the absence of war, the UN
Charter acknowledged the relationship between state security and human
dignity.41 More importantly, the UN Charter underscored the limitations of a
unilateral pursuit of security and in its stead sought to institutionalise a
regime of collective security with some focus on the human aspects of
security.42
Although collective security transcends global machineries for enforced
compliance with international law, the imperatives of international justice,
rule of law and opportunity to live a fulfilled life43 were largely sacrificed at
the altar of cold war politics. However, whether one subscribes to the views
of the interdependence theorists44 or to those of the neo-institutionalists, it
was becoming increasingly clear, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War,
that security could no longer be limited to preparation for war.45 Thus the
end of the Cold War inspired a movement towards a rethinking of the
militarised concept of security.46
The intimations of a Grotian moment in the mid-1980s47 questioned some
of the fundamentalisms of the Cold War. Some global problems such as
terrorism (international and state-sponsored), drug trafficking, organised
crime, environmental degradation, and unfair trade practices and policies
were increasingly recognised as threats to international peace and security.48
The militaristic conception of security, particularly in an age when the most

dangerous threats to security require holistic approaches,49 became ineffectual,
if not anachronistic,50 in the face of such global issues. If security had to be
meaningful, 51 its definition and praxis had to appreciate the imRortance of the
individual human, both as a subject and an object of security.
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The centring of the individual at the core of security is captured under the
emerging concept of human security, 53 a term most often associated with the
1994 Human Development Report on Human Security54 by Mahbub ul Haq.
Although the 1994 report has been credited with giving prominence to the
concept of human security, a human-centred conct of security is immanent
in the various international instruments preceding formation of the United
Nations. Instruments such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols make allusions to human security. 56 The 1994
report identifies four essential characteristics of human security, namely,
universality,

interdependence,

prevention

and

anthropocentricity

of

security.57 The sovereignty of the human being is inescapable. A caution
must be added here. Bodily soverenty cannot always be equated with human
security.58 Human security5 describes some balance between the need for
safety and the necessity of freedom. Absolutism in respect of either safety or
freedom would be naive and useless.
Threats to human security may be direct or indirect in their origins. Efforts
geared towards a systemic approach to organising these conceptualisations
into a coherent structure of international security underscore the theoretical

complexity of the concept of human security. 60 Although human security is a
noble idea,61 the question remains whether the concept has any constructive
impact on the behaviour or policies of states. Secondly, how is human security to
be realised in an era when governments use fear of terrorism as a policy of
choice?62

The constructivist impact of human security
The international order on peace and security is not short of grand and noble
ideas that died on the vine. There are several noble concepts that states
ostensibly celebrate but which are rarely applied or adopted in their policies.
Human security is a concept that most states would give rhetorical approval
to but of whose meaning few have a clear idea, let alone knowing how it
would be implemented. A potential drawback in the unwieldiness of the
concept of human security is the arbitrariness of choice that its vagueness
offers potential admirers. With the notable exceptions of Canada and Japan,
no state has articulated its foreign policy in the light of this theoretical
paradigm shift.
Human security is part of the more general project of global governance,
with all the attendant contradictions, challenges and trepidations. Is human
security constructive and how best could it be operationalised? In teasing
out the answers to this question, four main aspects of the concept of
human security must be considered: state

violence, environmental

degradation, population displacement and globalisation. Bearing these four
factors in mind, there are three main approaches to the constructivism and

implementation of human security. Each approach reflects a dimension of
human security. These dimensions are freedom from fear or rather, the safety
of the individual; guarantee of human rights and rule of law; freedom from
poverty; and the institutionalisation of social justice. 63
The first dimension, indeed a school of thought on human security,
conceives of human security broadly enough to encompass the rule of law
and international treaties, and multilateralism as vectors for restoring
human security. Needless to say, this approach is neoliberal and may be
construed as an extension of Kantian democratic peace.

64

On a slight

different level the construction of human security from the building blocks

5

of human rights is premised on three related mechanisms, namely,
sanctioning, shaming, and co-optation of deviant states into the family of
nations.66 Both approaches are constructive. They both rely on group
sanctions to correct and restrain deviant states. Sanctions and similar group
rebukes confine or limit the ability of the deviant to access goods, services
and capital markets until such a time when the deviant behaviour has been
sufficiently modified.
This method of implementing human security is effective only if the elites
in the offending state are vulnerable enough to international services, goods
and capital markets to impel them to adopt prescribed normative changes. It
is ineffective when the errant state is a powerful entity driven by its own
permutations of good and evil and impervious to group rebuke. Effective
shaming or rebuke relies on a group's shared sense of outrage and values.
The assumption here is that there is a body of acceptable modes of behaviour

to which

all states, regardless

of their historical

and contemporary

experiences have subscribed. What happens when the errant state is
unabashedly proud of its deviant status? Or when the group is polarised
on North -South lines?
Again, there is an assumption that all states have an equal sense of shame.
Where such assumption is untenable, misplaced or exaggerated, deviations
from acceptable norms induce little or no shame to the offending states.
Indeed, as in the case of the US invasion of Iraq, such errant behaviour could
metamorphose into patriotic fervour! Similarly, co-optation relies on a
complex system of 'verification' whereby the behaviour of offending states on
human rights is routinely checked and evaluated.67 The problem with this
approach is that in most cases the 'civilised self performs the task of
evaluating the behaviour of the 'barbaric other'. Biases and inconsistencies in
the evaluations are bound to occur. For example, while North Korea and
Iran have been condemned for their nuclear ambitions, Pakistan and Israel,
two notorious nuclear powers, have escaped rebuke. Such inconsistency
undermines human security.
The second dimension to human security is the humanitarian aspect, with a
focus on the safety of the individual, especially in the event of war. This
approach is institutionalised by the establishment of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and humanitarian treaties such as the Hague
Conventions regarding the laws of war. By creating a normative regime for
the conduct of war, the humanitarian approach underscores the safety of the
individual as a tenet of civilisation. The profound impact of this approach is

the outlawry of war itself as an instrument of national policy. Two additional
concepts, namely, peace maintenance and conflict prevention, have been
perceived as instruments of human security. Peacekeeping, peace building and
humanitarian assistance are logical extensions of this dimension of human
security.
The third and perhaps most problematic aspect of human security is
individual sustainable development. This approach focuses on non-military
factors that threaten human security and survival. This aspect of human
security

is heterogeneous, taking into account

population

explosion,

environmental degradation, fair trade and chronic poverty. This dimension of
human security probably derives from international agreements on economic,
social and cultural rights. Without question this is the most contentious and
elusive dimension of human security.

The persistence of falsehood and imperial delusions of order

Human security requires institutionalised responses to factors that diminish
human worth. The paradox here is that the state, supposedly a guarantor of
human dignity,

has been the most prolific destroyer of humanity.

68

Governments of all ideological persuasions have been much more fatal to
humanity than all natural tragedies combined. It has been estimated that over
169 million people have been killed since the start of the 20th centur4 by
both totalitarian and liberal-democratic governments across the world. 6
It is therefore not surprising that the human rights regime is preoccupied
with taming and reining in the feral proclivities of the state. As Makau wa

Mutua observed in his seminal critique of the conception of the state as a
predator:

The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever
bent on the consumption of humans. The human rights corpus is ostensibly
meant to contain the state, for the state is apparently the raison d'etre for the
corpus. Although savagery in human rights discourse connotes much more
than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery.
States become savage when they choke off and oust civil society. The 'good'
state controls its demonic proclivities by cleansing itself with, and internalizing,
human rights. The 'evil' state, on the other hand, expresses itself through an
illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture. The redemption or
salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights
norms. The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and
raison d'etre of human rights law.70

The notion of the state as a feral predator finds loud and iterative voices in
scholarly cogitations and institutional measures.

71

The statistics on state

predation on humanity are monumental. 72 Given that the global South is often
portrayed as the global epicentre for state brutality, 73 it follows that virtually all
human rights organisations are focused on identifying and shaming the 'savages'
of the global South. Notwithstanding egregious human rights abuses in all parts
of the world, the global South is synonymous with human rights abuses.
However, the narrative of the global South as a feral predator often
overlooks the cultural foundations of modern postcolonial states. Again, as

Makau wa Mutua presciently observes:

While the metaphor (of the state as a predator) may suggest otherwise, it is not
the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state. The
state only becomes a vampire when 'bad' culture overcomes or disallows the
development of 'good' culture. The real savage, though, is not the state but a
cultural deviation from human rights. That savagery inheres in the theory and
practice of the one-party state, military junta, controlled or closed state,
theocracy . . . not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive
instrumentality-a receptacle or an empty vessel-that conveys savagery by
implementing the project of the savage culture . . .The human rights corpus,
though well meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric, and suffers from several
basic and interdependent flaws captured in the Savage -Victim -Saviour
metaphor. First, the corpus falls within the historical continuum of the
Eurocentric colonial project, in which actors are cast into superior and
subordinate positions. Precisely because of this cultural and historical context,
the human rights movement's basic claim of universality is undermined.
Instead, a historical understanding of the struggle for human dignity should
locate the impetus of a universal conception of human rights in those societies
subjected to European tyranny and imr,erialism. Unfortunately, this is not part

of the official human rights narrative.

4

The moral is that, if human security is to be realised, the instinctive
demonisation of the global South must be replaced by a rational, transparent
and effective assessment of the perverse foundations and contemporary decay

of the postcolonial state itself. In particular, there must be a critical inquiry
into the role of the 'civilised self in the processes that led to the present
situation. This is a task that requires sensitivity to history, courageous
confrontation with ugly facts, and the political will to make necessary
amends. It is a task that must appreciate the inherent rights of peoples to
organise themselves in accord with their resources, socioeconomic demands
and spiritual world-view. A linear conception of history, with the global North
as the touchstone of 'civilisation' and the rest of the world playing 'catch-up'
is inconsistent with the concept of human security. Freedom is at the core
of human security. As Makau wa Mutua has eloquently argued:

The zeal to see all humanity as related and the impulse to help those defined as
in need is noble . . . a certain degree of human universality is inevitable and
desirable. But what that universality is, what historical and cultural stew it is
made of, and how it is accomplished make all the difference . . . the [imperial]
zeal to save others--even from themselves-is steeped in western and European
history. If one culture is allowed the prerogative of imperialism, the right to
define and impose on others what it deems f ood for humanity, the very
meaning of freedom will have been abrogated.7

Condescending claims, especially on the alleged inability of Africans, Arabs,
Muslims, etc to 'rise above the centrifugal pull of tribalism' 76 must yield to a
better understanding of the historical roots of human insecurity.77 The
totalising imagery of 'ethnic groups', 'tribes' and 'pre-modern' peoples blinded

by the lights of European modernisation, and hence unable to grope their
way out of anarchic and failing states,78 is a rhetoric that obscures the
structural pathologies of the postcolonial state. Retailers of this sanitised
version of history ignore the 'ethnic' foundations of European states.
The restructuring of the state may require redrawing the current boundary
lines of some states in Africa79 and in Arabia, and the promotion of a regime
of self-determination of peoples. Arguments for the perpetuation of the status
quo, especially in egregious cases such as the Kurdish question, are
irresponsible and mischievous. 80 A redrawing of boundaries is not always a
terrible thing.81 The focus should be on how to peacefully reorganise the
patchwork of colonially balkanised peoples to become 'geographic spaces of
peace and prosperity'.
Beyond restructuring flawed states of the global South, the foreign policies
of states of the global North must be critically evaluated. In this regard both
neoliberal fundamentalisms such as 'free markets' and riht-wing imperial
delusions of the 'clash of civilizations' must be restrained. 8 For far too long
millions of people in the global South have been massacred by proxies of the
global North in the name of imposing democracy and a free market. 83 While
neoliberal ideologues may extol the wonders of Kantian democratic peace,
the fact of the matter is that many so-called democracies are implicated in the
under-reported but lethal conflicts in the global South.84 From Vietnam
to Nicaragua, and from Afghanistan to Iraq, various atrocities have been
committed in the name of freedom and free markets. 85 The fundamentalism
of Bin Laden may not be much different in thought patterns, prescriptions,

moral certitude and totalising imagery as that of those who slaughter
the innocents in the name of freedom. 8"6
Military victories by imperial powers in states of the global South87 sow
the seeds of future tragedy. It was the Gulf war and the establishment of US
military bases in Arabia that partly motivated and inspired Osama bin Laden
to create the al-Qaeda network. In addition to the slaughter of innocents and
the vicious cycles of violence created by imperial delusions of order, the
environmental costs of imperial conquests are enormous. For example, in
Afghanistan 88 the USA used between 500 and 1000 metric tons of depleted
uranium in munitions to attack bunkers, caves and other hardened targets.89
Perhaps the most virulent manifestation of the gladiatorial approach to
security is the Bush Doctrine of 1 June 2002.90 The National Security
Strategy (NSS) paper issued by the White House91 on 17 September 2002
iterated the Bush Doctrine. The NSS asserts a US right to undertake
preemptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting off planned,
perceived or future attacks before they can occur. The NSS contains no clear
definition of what constitutes 'sufficient threat to [US] national security'.
Thus, there is ample room for arbitrary implementation. As Henry
Kissinger, a man not known for his deference to international law warned,
'it cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to
develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of pre-emption
against its own definition of threats to its security' .92 The Bush Doctrine
repudiates multilateral approaches to both collective and human security
and confirms the theory that the USA, and indeed other imperial Rowers,

only pursues multilateralism and diplomacy when it is convenient for it.93
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the Bush doctrine is imbued with neoliberal
rhetoric on the rule of law, respect for private property, democracy, free
markets, and so on.94
Beyond such neoliberal pretensions the hypocrisy of imperial powers in
matters of collective and human security, in and of itself, undermines human
security.95 For example, the USA continues to support the decadent regime
in Saudi Arabia and sustains many tyrants. The USA and other imperial
states have been instrumental in spreading weapons of mass destruction.96
The foreign policies of several powerful states of the global North are often
indistinguishable from those of notorious rogue states.97 The USA98 is as
guilty of international state terrorism (bombing of Sudan) and statesponsored terrorism (Contras in Nicaragua) as some of the notorious
members of the so-called 'axis of evil'.
Often imperial delusions of order are justified on the basis that the UN has
become sclerotic.99 While it is generally accepted that the UN has failed or
under-performed in several respects, neither the Bush Doctrine nor imperial
delusions of order are acceptable. 100 The world would be in worse shape if
the UN did not exist. Recent statistics unveiled by Human Security Centre in
2005 show that, since 1992, the number of armed conflicts has dropped by
40%. This unheralded decline is linked to a dramatic increase in UN conflict
prevention and peace building efforts. 101
Confounding conventional wisdom, the report reveals that all forms of
political violence, except international terrorism, have declined world-wide

since the early 1990s. The reduction in the number of conflicts is attributable
to the critical role played by the UN in spearheading a huge upsurge of
international conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building activities.
There is still much work to be done, however. Crises cannot be the main
criteria for evaluating the adequacy or lack thereof of institutions designed
for the maximisation of human dignity. 102
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